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Abstract 
 The 2012 amendment to the Portuguese Insolvency Law aspired to recover viable firms by 
introducing a locally adapted Chapter 11, named Processo Especial de Revitalização, though 
collecting wide-spread criticism in the process. This paper studies the outcome of 339 
reorganizations, dated from 2012 to 2013, highlighting a severe problem of filtering: 141 firms 
(41.6%) have already entered bankruptcy, have petitioned for a new reorganization or are 
inactive. Moreover, using the accounting information available and the Altman Model, neither 
reorganized companies appear to be fundamentally different from bankrupted firms, nor it was 
possible to winnow viable from non-viable firms. 
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Introduction 
Bankruptcy Law has implicitly regulated trade since credit as an institution gave its primal steps 
into existence. It is a pivotal economic matter, and the dialectical process of guaranteeing an 
efficient mechanism in managing default has been a permanent source of innovation in Law. 
From initial and primitive – and often barbaric – propositions laid by the Hammurabi Code or 
the Roman Twelve Tables to modern Western Law in its various forms1, Bankruptcy Law has 
shaped not merely the corporate environment but also consumer behaviour, while its arm’s 
length was never limited to distressed agents, altering the conditions faced by healthy firms and 
solvent individuals 2.  
Furthermore, there is hardly a long-lasting design to be applied to Bankruptcy Law. Even if it 
is certainly true that, in historical terms, primacy has been given by Portuguese legislators to 
the institution of liquidation, recent pro-debtor considerations altered the nature of the 
Portuguese Insolvency Code (Código da Insolvência e Recuperação de Empresas, hereinafter 
referred to as CIRE). Specifically, following the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis and the 
consequent Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Portuguese Government, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission and the European Central Bank, 
the need for new policies gained ground in regard to the corporate and household debt 
restructuring framework. Insolvency Law would need to be amended, “with technical 
assistance from the IMF”, in order to “better facilitate effective rescue of viable firms”, by – 
among other measures – “introducing fast track court approval procedures for restructuring 
plans3”. From such foundations, the 2012 amendment to the Portuguese Insolvency Law 
developed and a new hybrid procedure was introduced: a locally adapted Chapter 11, balancing 
                                                
1 For a complete overview of the early history of Bankruptcy Law, I strongly advise the reader the works of 
Levinthal (1918) or Menezes Leitão (2012). 
2 And being even responsible for a source of inspiration outside Economics. Even the play from which the 
previously provided reference was taken (a reference for which a justification is due), has its main plot inspired 
by Bankruptcy Law. 
3 Portugal - Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, 17th May 2011. 
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the influence of North-American Bankruptcy Law with the tradition of the German 
Insolvenzordnung or the Spanish Ley Concursal. A pre-bankruptcy measure, whose name was 
settled as Processo Especial de Revitalização (PER) and whose performance and adequacy is 
far from being a matter of consensus4. 
Four years have passed since the previously mentioned amendment, Lei n.º 16/2012 – in turn 
altered by the recent Decreto-Lei n.º 26/20155 – was enacted and data is now at a decent 
minimum to provide insight in terms of the policy’s efficiency. Moreover, due to the importance 
of Bankruptcy Law in defining the economic development of a given region and the conditions 
faced by economic agents (either solvent or insolvent), efforts should now be directed towards 
the analysis of its effectiveness. Particularly, assuming that the legislator’s task in facilitating 
the effective rescue of viable firms was successful, to what extent is the economic benefit of 
this legal mechanism being overpowered by the self-interest of non-viable firms’ managers and 
shareholders? And could this mechanism be further reshaped in order to prevent the 
postponement of the liquidation of non-viable companies? As Antonio’s prudence adverts, in 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, it is not seldom the case that positive and beneficial 
propositions are warped by wicked intentions. Or, as the legislator recognized regarding 
Insolvency Law, as far as 1899: 
…a astúcia dos interesses penetra e desconcerta as mais finas malhas da urdidura 
legislativa, e o dolo e a fraude, tantas vezes auxiliados pelo desleixo ou complacência 
dos próprios executores da lei, a breve trecho fazem do descrédito desta o pedestal dos 
seus triunfos.6 
The IMF itself recognized that, although the usefulness of the in-court restructuring procedure, 
PER, was generally acknowledged, “it has been sometimes utilized by insolvent companies that 
                                                
4 Though not limited to those authors, criticism was immediately heard by Menezes Leitão (2012) or Serra (2013). 
5 Producing minor changes, whose scope covered merely, in regard to CIRE, the quorum required for acceptance 
of the reorganization plan (Article 17-F).  
6 Preâmbulo ao Código das Falências 1899, in Menezes Leitão (2012). 
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are seeking to delay traditional insolvency proceedings7”, while urging for severer post-
reorganization oversight (a statement, which, while being valid, does not describe the full extent 
of the difficulties faced). Therefore, further critical inquiry should be made in how to winnow 
non-viable firms from accessing this legal instrument. 
A literature review regarding the fundamentals of bankruptcy and reorganization, the effects of 
bankruptcy law over finance and the characteristics of PER is presented in Section I. A brief 
depiction of the evolution of bankruptcy prediction models is also presented in Section II, 
setting the ground in which the methodology used for this study (described in Section III) lays. 
In Section IV a description of the primary sample (reorganized companies) is given, as well as 
for the two secondary samples (composed of healthy firms and bankrupted companies). The 
obtained results are presented in Section V, with a general discussion of the topic. Finally, the 
study conclusion, summarizing the findings and its consequences, is developed in Section VI. 
I. (a) The Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law and Reorganization 
In the event that a given debt contract is breached, creditors will attempt to force the collection 
of their debts by seizing the debtor’s assets. In a summarized stance, Hart (2000) points two 
different methods of asset seizure at the disposal of creditors in western jurisdictions, if a 
formally-defined Bankruptcy Law is absent. The first method, only available for secured loans, 
considers that such creditors may seize immediately the asset standing as collateral for the debt. 
However, since this contractual solution was not defined ex-ante in the case of unsecured loans, 
the creditor may, through court, induce the sale of the debtor’s assets. Both methods are 
consequently based upon the vigilantibus iura subveniunt principle – those who are vigilant are 
assisted by the law (Menezes Leitão 2012).   
Thus, the origins of Bankruptcy Law as a systematic set of rules is not primarily related with 
the protection of individual creditors, which could purely be enforced by the aforementioned 
                                                
7 Portugal - Eleventh Review Under the Extended Arrangement, and Request for Extension of the Arrangement 
and Waivers of Applicability of End-March Performance Criteria (IMF 2014). 
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mechanisms, but relates with the legal remedies by which the collective interest of creditors is 
guaranteed (Hart 2000; Mucciarelli 2013), obeying to an equalitarian principle (par conditio 
creditorum). And the economic reasons upholding this concept are rather straightforward: even 
if, for the purpose of this paper, bankruptcy is categorized as a legalistic event, financially it 
may be described as the indefinite inability of the firm to comply with the previously arranged 
conditions of its debt contracts; thus, if a collective mechanism is unavailable, a race for the 
debtor’s assets would inevitably arise, virtually denying any possibility of maintaining the firm 
as a going-concern (and, thereby, possibly reducing value for creditors).  
Described as the Creditor’s Bargain Theory, a compulsory law that coordinates debt-collection 
should provide creditors a reduction in strategic costs, an increase in the pool of assets and 
generate administrative efficiencies (Jackson 1982). Or, as Weijs (2012) asserts, such theory 
states that if creditors were asked how to handle a bankruptcy, in the absence of a bankruptcy 
law offering a collective procedure, they would suggest exactly that: a collective procedure. 
Asset stabilization, in terms of maintaining the value of a group of assets as a whole, as argued 
by Couwenberg and Lubben (2015), is located at the core of Bankruptcy Law and would not 
be safeguarded by contractual liberty alone. Also, von Thadden, Bergloef and Roland (2003) 
argued that though debt-collection plays a role, it should be complemented with a bankruptcy 
law that promotes ex-post efficiency (namely, regarding conflicts between creditors). 
Therefore, neglecting the inefficient and time-consuming prescience of establishing, in the debt 
contract, how to handle a future bankruptcy as well as the Orwellian supervision of the debtor 
that should follow, state-provided Bankruptcy Law, in its various forms, appears to be the most 
efficient method to deal with this common pool problem8. Additionally, this line of thought may 
well explain why reorganization plans, such as the North-American Chapter 11 or the 
                                                
8 Nonetheless, it should be noted that while state intervention may protect the collective private interests of 
creditors, it may also derive wicked solutions. Such may be the case if soft bankruptcy laws are enacted, in such a 
way that, for example, the error of saving non-viable firms from liquidation surpasses the protection of viable 
ones. 
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Portuguese Processo Especial de Revitalização, should not be available to individuals9. 
Although economic thought supports that a firm’s assets may be more valuable collectively 
than liquidated piecemeal, such reasoning is not as easily applicable to bankrupted individuals 
(especially non-entrepreneurs), who, independently from the outcome of the bankruptcy, 
cannot be separated from its faculties and, consequently, from their main source of value 
creation (Couwenberg and Lubben 2015). In fact, deeming such reasoning to be valid, this study 
focused merely on firms. 
Regarding the bankruptcy process itself, the literature identifies two general categories of 
bankruptcy procedures:  either an all-cash procedure or a structured-bargaining (Hart 2000). 
While the former provides a simple solution to a bankruptcy situation, by merely selling the 
assets under the supervision of a trustee, the latter requires creditors – the claimants –  to decide 
the future of the firm and the collection of their claims. And, while the prevailing trend is to 
shift towards a structured bargaining (Brouwer 2006; Frouté 2007; The World Bank 2012), 
some difficulties yet remain to be addressed. Structured bargaining may originate sub-optimal 
solutions, for example, due to fixed voting rights (Hart 2000). Accordingly, it is possible that 
creditors that have nothing to lose (secured creditors, who may accept a non-viable plan or force 
a controlled liquidation10 through a reorganization plan, often more time-efficient in the 
creditor’s standpoint) or that have nothing to gain, except by delaying the bankruptcy 
(shareholders, who hold a call option on the firm’s equity11), may control the reorganization 
process and expropriate value from unsecured creditors12.  
                                                
9 Regarding the Portuguese Insolvency Law (specifically, in terms of reorganization), the scope of the measure is 
still debated. While Carvalho Fernandes and Labareda (2013) suggest that reorganization is only applicable to 
corporations and entrepreneurs, Casanova and Dinis (2014) advocate the extension of the policy to consumers 
(Epifânio 2015). 
10 Analyzing the North-American experiment, Baird and Rasmussen (2002) debated that reorganizations are either, 
when completed by giant corporations, intended, in the majority of cases, as a mechanism of “orderly liquidation” 
or are “increasingly irrelevant” if completed by smaller firms. 
11 As shown in Figure 2 (Appendices). 
12 In fact, the same value-appropriation line of thought could be applied in the case of unsecured creditors (instead 
of shareholders), who may profit from delaying bankruptcy if the value of the firm is lower than the value of 
secured debt. 
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I. (b) Why Reorganization (and Bankruptcy Law) Matters 
Legal institutions – and in this particular case, Bankruptcy Law – play a significant role in 
economic prosperity. The inefficient must make way for the innovative and productive, freeing 
up resources, assets and liquidity to better uses – a corporate Darwinism, if such analogy is 
acceptable. Bankruptcy Law is the formal acceptance of this inevitable creative destruction.  
Therefore, a substantial amount of economic literature is devoted to analysing the effects of 
legal tradition and the structure of Bankruptcy Law on the overall economy.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) empirically suggested that capital markets liquidity is correlated with 
economic prosperity. In addition, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
compared the dimension of both equity and debt markets, using a sample of 49 countries, and 
found that the degree of investor protection offered positively affected the countries’ capital 
markets. The means by which law influences finance were  further described by the relationship 
between common-law systems and stronger investor laws (La Porta et al. 1998; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003; Brouwer 2006). Such sequential correlation matches the 
thought of the political mechanism (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003), stating that the 
protection of private investors – either shareholders or creditors – rights fosters financial 
development. An important balance is therefore widely addressed by the literature, in regard to 
the degree by which private property rights are favoured over State interests13. Further relevant 
factors, such as culture, are also cited to influence investors’ rights, although to a lesser degree. 
For example, Stulz and Williamson (2003) found that, after controlling for the legal system 
                                                
13 It is, however, fairly difficult to positively define what politically ought to be normative. Consequently, 
Bankruptcy Law is often subject to social welfare considerations, which may contradict efficiency ones, and the 
question whether such legal mechanism should accommodate socially-desirable ends is still debatable. In fact, 
several redistributive rules, though socially relevant, frequently arise from weaknesses of other social security 
institutions and may be inefficient (Mucciarelli 2013), in the sense that those “social concerns may be addressed 
more readily by law other than the insolvency law, such as social welfare legislation, than by designing an 
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origin and GNP per capita, investor protection is still influenced by the religious tradition of 
the country.  
Finally, another mechanism, the so-called “adaptability” mechanism (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine 2003), may also be responsible for the previously mentioned influence of law over 
finance. Under such school of thought, legal tradition defines the system’s ability to adapt to 
ever-changing circumstances, undermining or allowing the functioning of financial institutions. 
Though non-negligible scepticism is found in the literature (ibid.), the majority of authors agree 
that to a certain extent, legal tradition and institutions are responsible for financial and economic 
development. 
While the Law and Finance Theory often emphasises the balance between private rights and 
state-interests, authors often draw further differences between countries by establishing a 
similarly straightforward distinction of pro-debtor or pro-creditor laws (Succurro 2010; 
Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra 2012). And, although such categorization may be infrequently 
problematic, evidence suggests that the decision to favour one specific side defines the 
behaviour of the economy. Moreover, even if distinctions may often be straightforward, such 
decisions seldom are. As pointed by Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1998), the discussion on 
Insolvency Law would be rather incomplete if both an efficient solution to corporate financial 
distress and an optimal set of investment incentives were not simultaneously proposed. 
Consequently, in a bankruptcy scenario, legislation must accommodate a shift of bargaining 
power to creditors, so that creditors’ claims are shielded from further damage, without 
restraining the ex-ante investment decision of the entrepreneur (Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender 
1998; Succurro 2010). A delicate balancing is, therefore, required from the legislator.  
Moreover, even if one single solution to this balance may be ruled out, in the sense that the 
optimal model may depend upon other country-specific factors (Hart 2000; Djankov et al. 
2008), it is suggested that favouring an entrepreneurial and debtor-friendly environment may 
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lead to enhanced growth. While addressing specifically the impact of Insolvency Law in the 
outcome of financially distressed firms, Gutierrez et al. (2012) found that the value of 
corporations in financial distress diminishes if facing creditor-oriented legal systems. The 
authors further expanded the topic by suggesting that pro-creditors laws may cause losses of 
efficiency in distressed firms, due to a higher propensity to sub-optimal investment decisions, 
namely, by means of debt-overhang (underinvestment) or overinvestment. Additionally, a loss 
of efficiency should arise in bankrupted corporations, as a result of the increased probability of 
liquidating efficient firms, under systems favouring creditors. Frouté (2007) also proposed, 
using a theoretical framework, that pro-debtor law is in line with creditors’ interests, thus 
improving efficiency. Such arguments, as a consequence, could be seen as an additional 
justification for the past changes of European countries’ Bankruptcy Law towards debtor-
friendly systems. 
If such distinction had to be drawn, the 2012 amendment to CIRE would likely be described as 
debtor-oriented, by obeying the lines of the North-American Chapter 11 (Gonçalves 2013), the 
most prominent debtor-oriented legal mechanism (Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra 2012). 
Considering the paradigmatic case of the Chapter 11 vis-à-vis Chapter 7, Bankruptcy Law was 
designed in the U.S. in such a way to allow viable firms to be restructured by the former, while 
guaranteeing that firms fated to fail are filter and liquidated by the latter (White 1994). 
Analogously, endeavours should be focussed on ensuring that ideally nonviable companies are 
unable to restructure under the Portuguese design. Or, using the nomenclature frequently found 
in the literature, this paper deals mainly with Type I error, i.e., nonviable firms that are saved 
by means of a restructuring plan14 (ibid.). Although data is scarce regarding the Portuguese 
legal system results, comparisons may be drawn with the United States. Evidence suggests that 
such error is not infrequent, and may represent a substantial part of reorganizations. Hotchkiss 
                                                
14 As opposed to Type II error, referring to viable firms that are liquidated. 
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(1995) found that, in a sample of 197 companies that were subject to a Chapter 11 
reorganization plan, 32% re-entered bankruptcy or restructured their debt out of court. Alderson 
and Betker (1999) found that 24% of their sample required a second debt restructuring and an 
additional 3% were liquidated within five years of the initial reorganization. More recently, 
lower rates were found, but the recidivism rate still reached 18.25% (Altman and Branch 2015). 
Even if the acceptance of debtor-friendly laws is reaching a consensus, international data 
suggest that such system is far from being fully efficient. 
Furthermore, the origin of such error and its subsistence are fairly intelligible. Frequently, 
restructuring and, thus, delaying formal bankruptcy, may be beneficial for the firm’s 
shareholders and managers. While the former will enjoy the increase of the call option15 that 
implicitly describes the value of equity (the so-called “delay and pray” and “pretend and 
extend” that expropriates value from creditors), the latter may, for example, extend their jobs’ 
life expectancy (White 1994; Povel 1999). White (1994) further demonstrated that pooling 
between managers of both viable and nonviable companies may also benefit the former group: 
if filtering viable from non-viable corporations frequently fails, creditors may be willing to 
accept lower payments from viable firms, due to their inability to correctly categorize the 
debtor.  
Finally, the existence of such incentives often leads to losses borne by other undistinguishable 
economic agents – i.e., not only creditors - due to spillover effects, so that viable firms and 
especially healthy firms may also be negatively influenced by a flawed law. Not only does 
Insolvency Law certainly define the ultimate economic value of a financially distressed firm 
(Gutiérrez, Olmo, and Azofra 2012), but it may also influence the conditions faced by the 
remaining companies, for example, by increasing the cost of debt (Rodano, Serrano-Velarde, 
and Tarantino 2013). Davydenko and Franks (2008) also argue that creditors adjust collateral 
                                                
15 As shown in Figure 2 (Appendices). 
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requirements in order to accommodate national differences in Bankruptcy Law. Nonetheless, 
the latter authors observed that such legal differences were still connected with national 
variability in terms of bankruptcy outcome, despite the creditors’ adjustment.  
I. (c) The “Portuguese Chapter 11” 
First introduced in 2012, PER was seen as opposed to the very nature of CIRE - the latter being 
mainly inspired by the German Insolvenzordnung, thus ending in 2004 the pro-debtor tendency 
of its predecessor, CPEREF16 (Menezes Leitão 2012). In fact, while CPEREF set as the 
foundation of bankruptcy the maintenance of the firm as a going-concern, CIRE altered the 
nature of the law by giving primacy to creditors’ rights. Those rights could either be guaranteed 
by the liquidation of the distressed firm or by its restructuring, and creditors were given absolute 
rule over such assessment. 
A further change was however imposed by the 2012 amendment, introducing a pre-insolvency 
restructuring and thus partially tempering the incapacity of CIRE to deal with the Portuguese 
economic crisis. The mechanism is defined by Articles 17-A to 17-I, complemented by the 
remaining articles encompassed in CIRE, mutatis mutandis, and finally and analogously to the 
latter, by Código de Processo Civil (Epifânio 2015). Following the intent of reducing the court 
involvement in bankruptcies, it is also a hybrid proceeding (in fact, it may be viewed as a quasi 
out of court mechanism); however, it is still a judicial procedure, classified as urgent (Art 17-
A, paragraph 3). Finally, it is a proceeding in which creditors compete for their claims and in 
which the final reorganization plan binds every creditor, even those who did not participate in 
the process or disagreed with the plan17 (Art 17-F. paragraph 6). 
Several characteristics are shared with the North-American Chapter 11, namely the institution 
of debtor-in-possession and automatic stay. Consequently, due to the former, the incumbent 
management remains in charge of the company, although a trustee-like figure is appointed 
                                                
16 Código dos Processos Especiais de Recuperação da Empresa e de Falência. 
17 At least, as later discussed, creditors other than the State. 
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(Administrador Judicial Provisório), hence limiting the management decision-making freedom 
as defined by Art 17-E, paragraph 2 and subsequently Art 161 (CIRE). An automatic stay is 
also implemented, preventing collection of debt during the negotiation period and extinguishing 
any lawsuit, except if defined otherwise in the reorganization plan (Art 17-E, paragraph 1). 
Using the index provided by Gutiérrez et al (2012), which compares the orientation of 
reorganization instruments in terms of debtor and creditors rights, it is possible to conclude that, 
similarly to the Spanish Law, the Portuguese proposition, PER, is fairly close to the pro-debtor 
system prevailing in the United States18. It should, nonetheless, be mentioned that some 
questions arise in regard to the score of certain variables. For example, while PER affects 
guaranteed creditors, there is low flexibility when negotiating with the State; in fact, any 
proposal outside the range defined by Lei Geral Tributária, should constitute a non-negligible 
violation of the Law and should result in the rejection of the plan by the court19 (Gonçalves 
2013; Menezes Leitão 2015). Furthermore, although the debtor-in-possession financing, 
described by Art 17-H, is conceptually similar to the North-American counterpart, it is limited 
in extent. While, in the North-American tradition, priority is always given to new capital – a 
quasi-violation of the absolute priority rule (Brouwer 2006) – Portuguese Law fails to provide 
an attractive seniority for fresh capital, ranking before guaranteed creditors and state claims 
(Gonçalves 2013; Menezes Leitão 2012; Epifânio 2015). In fact, according to Epifânio (2015), 
a more ambitious solution should be attempted, similarly to the Spanish, French and Italian 
counterparts, in which new capital is regarded as an insolvency claim. 
II. Predicting Bankruptcy 
Although virtually non-existent before 1965, bankruptcy prediction models have developed 
exponentially, offering today a robust solution to an array of industries and agents, from credit 
                                                
18 The index score for Portugal was computed using the same methodology found in Gutiérrez et al, and may be 
compared with the results found by the authors in Table 4 (Appendices).  
19 Recently, a less harsh solution is often applied and the plan is accepted, though not affecting state-related entities. 
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risk and portfolio managers to academics and – conceivably – legislators20. From simple ratio 
analysis firstly performed in the 1930’s; to the Univariate and subsequent Multivariate 
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) that reigned in the 1960’s and 1970’s; to the Logit and Probit 
Models of the 1980’s and 1990’s; and finally the Neural Networks that appeared at the end of 
the last century21 (Bellovary, Giacomino, and Akers 2007), bankruptcy prediction has yet to 
fully materialize its usefulness to Bankruptcy Law’s design.  
Originally developed for taxonomic research (Fisher 1936), Discriminant Analysis has been 
successfully used in several financial studies and it could be stated that its popularity is mainly 
due to the work of Altman (1968), who coined the industry’s well-known Z-Score. An 
honourable mention should also be made regarding the pioneer univariate study of ratio analysis 
developed by Beaver (1966). While certainly simplistic, evidence shows that, historically, it is 
the most accurate method, only matched by Neural Networks (Bellovary, Giacomino, and 
Akers 2007); also, its simplicity remains a fundamental advantage of the model, which may be 
virtually used by any individual, with no prior knowledge of statistical techniques. Moreover, 
the comprehensive study performed by the same authors also implies that modern models, 
independently from the technique used, may not be as efficient as the original MDA, nor more 
factors suggest a higher predictive capability. Altman (1968), using five predictors only, 
registered a 95% accuracy in predicting bankruptcy, one year prior to the event (increasing the 
timeframe to two and three years would yield an accuracy of 72% and 48%, respectively). Later 
studies from other authors using MDA also registered promising results22. Recently, in 2009, a 
variant of the Z-Score model was used to filter recurring bankruptcies (non-viable corporations) 
                                                
20 It should be recognized that the raison d’être of this study and particularly the proposed methodology is hardly 
original. In fact, the nature of the problem addressed is considerably related with similar endeavours made by 
Altman. Hence, similarities are even shared in the motivation of the study, in the sense that there is also the belief 
“that a credible corporate distress predication model can (…) be used as an independent technique by the 
bankruptcy court to assess the future viability of the reorganization plan” (Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot 
2009). 
21 And the yet more recent development of Support Vector Machines, allowing for non-linearity and non-
monotonicity in the model (Härdle, Moro, and Schäfer 2005; Lacerda and Russ 2008).  
22 For example, the works of Deakin (1972), Marais (1979), or Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985). 
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from viable firms, observing that the former had a significantly worse financial profile than the 
latter (Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot 2009).  Studies abroad were also attempted; for 
example, using a sample of British companies, bankruptcy was predicted five-years prior to the 
event with an accuracy over 80%  (El Hennawy and Morris 1983).  In Italy, an accuracy above 
90% in the first year was achieved, with success rates not lower than 70% for the whole five-
year period (Altman, Falini, and Danovi 2013).  
Some disadvantages are nonetheless widely recognized. As pointed out by Ohlson (1980), one 
of the first to apply Logit models in bankruptcy prediction, the bankrupted and non-bankrupted 
groups do not share the same variance-covariance matrices, limiting its usefulness in the 
Econometrics field. Moreover, the requirement for normality regarding the models predictors 
is often disregarded – nonetheless, “deviations from the normality assumption, at least in 
economics and finance, appear more likely to be the rule rather than the exception23”. Even if 
it must be recognized that a substantial bias may be present in the econometric analysis of MDA 
(Eisenbeis 1977), the previously mentioned pitfalls may be considered negligible in face of the 
ultimate purpose of the model: to simply provide a discriminating instrument (Ohlson 1980). 
In terms of Portuguese studies, discriminant analysis was, for example, used as a credit score 
model (Soares 2006). Lacerda and Moro (2008) also tested the predictors of default for 
Portuguese firms by using Logit, MDA and Support Vector Machines. Bonfim (2009) deepened 
the characterization of the determinants of default for Portuguese firms by simultaneously 
considering firm-specific data and macroeconomic variables, thus discussing the predictive 
power of idiosyncratic and systematic factors. Another noteworthy analysis of corporate 
creditworthiness, with similar objectives, was also performed by Antunes, Ribeiro and Antão 
(2005).  
                                                
23 (Eisenbeis 1977) 
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Finally, scarce – partially justifiable, attending to the temporal dimension of the 2012 
amendment –  literature has been devoted to characterizing the effects of PER. APAJ, 
Associação Portuguesa de Administradores Judiciais – hardly an independent source of data –
publishes data, in association with Turnwin, only on an intermittent basis. Simão (2015)  
provided insightful data and found that only  58% of the companies that filed for reorganization 
remain active. However, the sample used included companies whose plan was immediately 
rejected, either by creditors or by the court. In addition – and contrarily to the author’s 
conclusion – the “low level of success in negotiations” should not be viewed necessarily as a 
failure of the Law, since it may indicate an appropriate filtering of viable from non-viable 
companies. In fact, the most important figure should not be the percentage of firms whose plan 
fails to be approved, but the incidence of firms that fail to prosper after a plan is put in motion.  
III. Methodology 
Combining a group of three major samples (restructured companies, bankrupted ones and 
healthy firms) a wide range of questions could be addressed. Namely, are restructured 
companies fundamentally different from bankrupted entities in terms of financial indicators? 
Additionally, could MDA be used to filter healthy companies from firms who file for 
reorganization in the following year? And, if such is the case, could the same methodology be 
applied to restructuring proceedings in order to filter between viable and non-viable firms, thus 
assisting court officials in analysing reorganization plans24? 
Descriptive statistics were thus computed mainly inspired by the independent variables of the 
predictive model provided by Altman and Hotchkiss (2005) for private firms (the Z’’-Score). 





                                                
24 Similarly to the methodology used by the already mentioned work of Altman et al (2009). 
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Moreover, the predictive capacity of MDA was used repeatedly in order to differentiate 
between healthy and distressed firms; bankrupted from reorganized companies; and using a 
sample of reorganized companies only, viable and non-viable firms. Though simplistic, such 
model was chosen hoping that – if successful – it could be massively used by court officials 
and lay parties, while avoiding the complexity and the prolixity of other econometric 
techniques.  
Theoretically, MDA is a linear combination of a given set of variables, Xj,i, with the purpose 
of categorising each observation into one group. A score, Zi, is therefore derived, as follows
25: 
Zi= 𝛾&𝑋&,()&*+                                                               (1) 
in which γj, the discriminant coefficients, are calculated in order to maximize the distance 
between the mean of the analysed groups. 
Furthermore, this mentioned objective is satisfied if, additionally, the following equation is also 
verified26: 
γ=C-1(XGroup	A	 − 	X	Group	B)                                                  (2) 
where γ represents a vector containing the discriminant coefficients, C the covariance matrix of 
the estimators and X a vector composed of the predictors’ means, per group. 
Finally, the score obtained for each observation is then compared with a given cut-off point, 
under which the company is classified under Group B. Such cut-off point, α, is usually defined  
 
                                                
25 As elaborated by Resti and Sironi (2007). 
26 Applicable to a two group case.	
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as the mean between the two centroids27 (also considering a two group scenario): 
α=0.5𝛄B(XGroup	A	 + 	X	Group	B)                                            (3) 







                                                   (4) 
where 𝜋UVWXY	Z denotes the prior probability of Group B, and 𝑍( and 𝛼 refer to the values 
derived in equations (2) and (3), respectively. Thus, though an analogous cut-off point of 50% 
is implied, we may define a stricter critical value, in order to diminish the incidence of Type I 
errors.  
Regarding the case discussed here, the problem assumes a binary form with only two possible 
groups, either bankrupted or non-bankrupted companies (and viable or non-viable firms). Its 
final linear form is hence given by: 
Zi=γ1X1,i+γ2X2,i+γ3X3,i+γ4X4,i                                           (5) 
where Zi denotes the overall score, γj the discriminant coefficients and	Xj,i  each discriminant 
variable (the previously presented ratios).  
IV. Sample Analysis  
The firm selection was entirely constructed using the information available in Citius, an online 
database managed by the Portuguese Ministry of Justice. Reorganized companies were selected 
if a reorganization plan was approved by the court between May of 2012 and December 2013, 
rendering a total of 355 firms. From this gross sample, 11 firms were excluded due to a 
subsequent and negative revision of the plan’s homologation; and an additional 5 observations 
were dropped due to utter unavailability of the firms’ records. Financial data was then collected 
for the year prior to the approval of the reorganization plan (either the end of 2011 or 2012), 
using Bureau Van Dijk’s SABI database, thus providing insight regarding several accounting 
                                                
27 If assuming equal prior probabilities of occurrence for each group.  
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indicators, namely, total assets, current assets, retained earnings, total equity, total liabilities, 
current liabilities and earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT). Regarding the outcome of the 
reorganization, Citius was then used to unveil if the companies filed again under PER or 
petitioned for bankruptcy. Finally, though such companies were used for analysing the 
percentage of recidivist firms, 61 firms were later dropped due to the unavailability of at least 
one of the mentioned variables. 
In order to deepen our understanding of the reorganization phenomenon, a second sample of 
315 bankrupted companies was extracted, limited to firms with no record of a previous attempt 
of restructuring and whose bankruptcy petition was contemporaneous to the restructuring 
proceedings of the first sample. Finally, 382 healthy firms were selected (firms which are still 
active and have no record of insolvency proceedings), composing a third sample. In line with 
the methodology previously used, these samples included the financial indicators described 
before, for the year 2012.   
Descriptive statistics for four samples were computed28. In terms of industry distribution and 
relative to the remaining samples, there is a higher incidence of construction and manufacturing 
firms in restructuring proceedings. 
Figure 1 – Distribution by Industry29 
 
Regarding the actual status of the companies whose reorganization plan was approved in 2012 
or 2013, 141 companies (41.6%) have either entered bankruptcy, attempted a new 
                                                
28 Note that the sample denominated by “PER-U” corresponds to the final gross sample of 339 restructured firms, 
while “PER-R” does not include the 61 firms for which the financial data was incomplete. 
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reorganization or are inactive. However, adding the number of companies with registered 
payment incidents, almost half of the reorganizations (48.4%) have failed. 





 Plan’s Acceptance   
 3Q 2012 4Q 2012 1Q 2013 2Q 2013 3Q 2013 4Q 2013 Total 
No record of failure 0 7 25 40 30 73 175 
Bankruptcy requested 0 8 23 17 19 23 90 
Second reorganization 1 4 14 7 5 10 41 
 Inactive 0 0 0 4 3 3 10 
 Payment Incident30 0 1 2 6 7 7 23 
Moreover, recidivism took, on average, 644 days to materialise and data suggests that an 
insolvency petition is, in the majority of cases, filed sooner than a second reorganization plan 
(Figure 3 – Appendices). One possible explanation is the lack of flexibility from creditors in 
the event of default following a reorganization plan, combined with the difficulties arising from 
a further strike on the debtor’s credibility – thus reducing the probability of agreement over the 
plan, and the attractiveness of the mechanism itself, even for debtors. 
Additionally, recurring to the four predicators of the Z’’-Score model (Altman and Hotchkiss 
2005), it may be suggested that bankrupted companies and restructured ones are not 
fundamentally different, when analysing financial data from the year prior to bankruptcy or 
reorganization, respectively, as shown in Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 (found in Appendices). 
Regarding X1 (Net Working Capital/Total Assets) and X2 (Retained Earnings/Total Assets), 
similarities within the mentioned samples are rather evident.  Additionally, results match the 
economic intuition, with healthy firms exhibiting a more robust score than distressed firms. 
Finally, under the hypothesis that data follows a normal distribution according to the Jarque-
Bera test, neither variable appears to be normally distributed at a 5% significance level. 
                                                
30 Companies with recorded payment incidents (as provided by SABI) over the last 3 years, higher than 5% of the 
pre-reorganization total liabilities figure and excluding firms included in the previous categories. 
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Similar results are found in relation to the remaining predictors, namely, the Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes and Total Assets ratio (X3 Variable) and the ratio given by Book Value of 
Equity divided by Total Liabilities (X4 Variable). Once again economic intuition is in line with 
the distribution of both variables, though healthy firms exhibit poorer results in terms of EBIT 
than anticipated (certainly the scars of the debt crisis). Once more, performing the Jarque-Bera 
test, the distribution of the variables does not exhibit signs of normality, except in the case of 
variable X4_PER (Figure 7, bottom). 
V. Results 
The Z’’-Score model was then recalibrated in order to, firstly, distinguish between healthy and 
financially distressed31 Portuguese firms (models A and B). As shown in Table 2, the 
coefficients obtained using equation (2) are in line with economic intuition, so that a worse ratio 
score negatively affects the overall model score, thus increasing the probability of default. 
Table 2 – Discriminant Function Results: Predicting Financial Distress 
Determinant Expected Sign Healthy and Insolvent Firms (A) 
Healthy and Restructured 
Firms (B) 
X1 Positive 0.395 0.581 
X2 Positive 0.635 0.879 
X3 Positive 1.286 1.221 
X4 Positive 0.033 0.028 
Moreover, if we define a maximum Type I error of 25%, i.e., correctly identifying 75% of the 
distressed companies as so, the first model (A), discriminating between healthy and insolvent 
firms, was still able to correctly identify 67% of the healthy firms. Regarding the second model 
(B), the correct-in-sample classification of healthy companies shrank to 63%. Results, in terms 
of the models’ classification power are therefore in line with the Portuguese literature32. Wilks’ 
Lambda, as, once again, provided by Resti and Sironi (2007), was also computed for both 
                                                
31 Firms that attempted a reorganization or were declared bankrupt in the following year. 
32 For example, Soares (2006). 
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models, deriving 0.84 and 0.87 for model A and B, respectively33. Also, by performing a F-test, 
both models appear to be statistically significant as a whole (at a 5% significance level).  
However, discriminant analysis fails to distinguish between successful reorganizations and 
recidivists (Table 3, model C). Using the same approach, the model yields far less enthusiastic 
results. Although it is better than mere chance – using the formula provided by Resti and Sironi 
(2007), thus suggesting a cut-off point of -0.166, the model correctly identifies 67% of 
successful reorganizations and 42% of failed ones34 – the low predictive capacity of the model 
implies little to no usefulness. In addition, no straightforward connection may be drawn 
regarding the sign and magnitude of the discriminant coefficients, and in fact two out of four 
conflict with prior expectations. Moreover, with a Wilks’ Lambda of 0.97, the model does not 
appear to be significant at a 5% level (by means of a F-test). 
Table 3 – Discriminant Function Results: Predicting Reorganization Failure 
Determinant Expected Sign 
Failed and Successful 
Reorganizations (C) 
Bankrupted and Restructured 
Firms (D) 
X1 Positive -0.019 -0.226 
X2 Positive 0.017 0.081 
X3 Positive 1.002 0.869 
X4 Positive -0.370 -0.055 
A similar conclusion is made clear when designing a model to differentiate bankrupted from 
restructured firms (model D). While, in fact, the model as a whole appears to be statistically 
significant at a 5% level35, its Wilks’ Lambda – slightly under 0.97 – suggests no better 
performance than the previously mentioned model. Also, the derived coefficient signs result in 
a meaningless interpretation, contrary to economic thought. Thus, the model classifies the 
                                                
33 Wilks’ Lambda is commonly used to test if differences between two given groups’ means exist. Thus, smaller 
values indicate greater discriminatory capability of the model. 
34 Note that the weight of each group was unequal and, more precisely, companies that restructured successfully 
represented 63% against 37% of companies that later failed. 
35 Though the only relevant variable appears to be X3.	
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majority of firms as non-bankrupted, scoring a hit-rate (i.e., correct classifications) of 73% on 
the non-bankrupted group but only 43% on the group consisting of bankrupted firms. 
Firstly, since the model failed to adequately discriminate between bankrupted and reorganized 
firms, some natural scepticism arises regarding the filtering capacity of the Portuguese law. 
Although, it must be noted, Portuguese Law does not rely upon direct accounting measures to 
determine bankruptcy, it is hardly credible that insolvent firms are no different from firms with 
only an infrequent inability to comply with financial obligations (as a company eligible for 
reorganization is defined by CIRE, Art 17-B), even in terms of accounting measures.  
If two alternatives are presented to a distressed debtor and neither an efficient oversight nor 
legal sanctions are put in place, the most beneficial option to the debtor will be chosen, even if 
it conflicts with the law design: law enforcement is far from being guaranteed by mere law 
enactment. Even if Portuguese Law clearly delineates a duty of the debtor to timely declare 
bankruptcy (Art 18, CIRE), there is virtually no mechanism that prevents non-viable firms from 
attempting a reorganization and thus delaying bankruptcy. As critically recognized by Menezes 
Leitão (2012), while the law clearly limits restructuring to viable companies in a state of 
imminent insolvency (Art 17-A, CIRE), it is the debtor who must declare if such requirement 
is satisfied (Art 17-A, paragraph 2, CIRE). Consequently, if no oversight is made by a third 
party and if no penalty is enforced by the court over non-viable debtors, the self-interest of the 
latter group will certainly prevail. One possible solution36, though conflicting with the debtor-
friendly nature of the law, would be to require a declaration from a third party confirming that 
the company is viable, which should be attached to the initial petition. In fact, this requirement 
was initially suggested in the draft of PER and is common practice in some jurisdictions, 
namely in the German system.  
                                                
36 A partial solution should be read, since no naivety exists in the following lines. 
	
25 of 34 
Secondly, though the study failed to determine if a given company is more likely to succeed or 
to enter again in a state of financial distress, the model’s failure may imply that reorganizations 
do not fail because it is too late to restructure, since a priori financial data provides none to 
negligible information regarding the success of a given plan. Thus, companies with a worse 
financial score are as likely to succeed in restructuring as healthier firms. Robust conclusions 
are evidently difficult to draw; however, it appears to be the case that either the financial 
situation of a company has no significant influence in its sustainability or the relation is being 
distorted and the plan’s formulation is dictating the company’s sustainability, when the opposite 
relation should prevail.  
Thus, a stricter line could – and should – be drawn in defining if a company is able to reorganize. 
Reorganization, as defined by the Portuguese Law, should not be mistaken for bankruptcy, 
since the latter already offers a mechanism to ensure companies are not inevitably liquidated 
(the so called “bankruptcy with a restructuring plan”, similar to the Sanierungsplan of the 
German counterpart). With no well-defined rule to reject insolvent firms from reorganization, 
there is growing certainty that the seldom used “bankruptcy with a restructuring plan” is being 
heavily counterweighed by an indiscriminate use of PER. Though it is undeniable that PER 
follows – at least partially – the best practices of other jurisdictions, there is no doubt that a 
high portion of debtors are inappropriately employing the mechanism. 
VI. Conclusion 
Deeply inspired by the initial work of Altman (1968) and the later adaptation to the Chapter 22 
problem (Altman, Kant, and Rattanaruengyot 2009; Altman and Branch 2015), part of the 
research here conducted aimed at differentiating bankrupted companies from merely distressed 
ones and, by a similar method and more importantly, viable from non-viable reorganizations. 
Though these two models failed to winnow companies under such criteria, the results allow 
nonetheless to establish some conclusions.  
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Accounting ratios suggest that bankrupted firms are not fundamentally different from 
reorganized companies, when analysing the year prior to the legalistic event, i.e., bankruptcy 
or reorganization, respectively. Even if such conclusion may not be entirely surprising, in the 
sense that insolvency may heavily depend upon other variables, some natural scepticism may 
arise in regard to the filtering capacity of the Portuguese Law. Consequently, it would be 
particularly stimulating to analyse the success rate of SIREVE, an analogous mechanism to PER 
(though out of court), which requires the approval of IAPMEI37. 
Successful reorganizations do not appear to differ from failed ones either, by accounting 
analysis. Thus, further research should be made with data from the reorganization plans. In fact, 
if such information was not added to the present study it was merely due to the immense 
difficulties that would arise: having access to more than three hundred plans from private firms 
is unsurprisingly a rather problematic quest. No doubts remain about how insightful this 
analysis would be in order to assess if indeed some companies are restructuring with the intent 
of completing a controlled liquidation and if a supermajority per class of creditor should be 
implemented.  
The most important conclusion remains, however, in the Portuguese recidivism rate regarding 
reorganizations. Over 41% of the reorganizations from 2012 and 2013 have failed, motivating 
doubts over the efficiency of the mechanism. Thus, evidence suggest that the feasibility 
standard38 has been poorly implemented in Portuguese reorganizations.  
 
 
                                                
37 An organization that provides financial and technical support to Portuguese firms, especially small and medium 
companies. Since such organization filters companies using mere accounting information, the mentioned analysis 
would be particularly interesting in providing a more robust interpretation of this paper findings. 
38 For example, as understood and defined by Chapter 11. While this requirement is only indirectly present in the 
Portuguese Law, North-American courts require companies to demonstrate that a reorganization plan will not be 
followed by liquidation or a second reorganization. Thus, debtors must provide evidence supporting that the plan 
is feasible.		
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APPENDICES 
Table 4 – Gutiérrez et al (2012) law orientation index 
 
Factor USA Spain Germany (Insolvenzordnung) Portugal 
Declaration Procedure     
Requirements 0 0.5 1 0 
Who can File? 0.5 0 0.5 0 
Control of the Firm     
Who decides the first step? 0 0.5 1 0.5 
Firm’s Management 0 0.25 0.75 0.25 
Automatic Stay 0 0.5 0.25 0 
DIP Financing 0 0 0 0 
Conclusion of the proceeding     
Presentation of the plan 0 0 0.5 0 
APR Violations 0 0 1 0 
Affects guaranteed creditors 0 1 0 1 
Approval of plan 0.5 0 0.5 1 
Total 1 2.75 5.5 2.75 
 
§ Requirements: 1 – overindebtedness; 0.5 – insolvency required; 0 – no requirement. 
§ Who can file?: 1 –  creditors; 0.5 debtor or creditors; 0 – debtor. 
§ Who decides at first step?: 1 – creditor or agent; 0.5 – court; 0 – debtor. 
§ Firm’s Management: 1 – external administrator; 0.75 – administrator (preferable) or debtor; 0.5 debtor 
(preferable) or administrator; 0.25 – debtor (limited decision-making capacity); 0 – debtor. 
§ Automatic Stay: 1 – no; 0.5 – only non-guaranteed creditors; 0.25 – time limited; 0 – all creditors. DIP 
financing: 1 – no; 0 – yes. 
§ Debtor-in-possession Financing: 1 – no; 0 – yes. 
§ Presentation of the plan: 1 – administrator; 0.5 – debtor or creditors; 0 – debtor priority. 
§ Absolute Priority Rule Violations: 1 – no; 0 – yes. 
§ Affects guaranteed creditors: 1 – no; 0 – yes. 
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Figure 2 – Equity as a Call Option 
 
Note: Adapted from Berk and DeMarzo (2013). 
As suggested, equity may be seen as a call option held by shareholders on the assets of the firm, whose 
strike price is given by the face value of debt. Thus if the value of the firm does not exceed the face 
value of debt, shareholders will not exercise the option and the firm will enter bankruptcy, with creditors 
taking over the firms’ assets; if, however, the value of the firm exceeds the value of debt, the option will 
be exercised and equity holders will receive the residual claim, i.e., the value of the firm after all debt 
claims have been paid. 
If this reasoning is combined with the Black-Scholes model – the latter implying that the longer the 
maturity the higher should be the option price – it should be clear how shareholders benefit from a 
“delay and pray” strategy, i.e., how they benefit by delaying bankruptcy. 
 










 A B 
Observations 41 90 
Mean 2.347 1.501 
25th percentile 2.04 2.08 
Median 2.43 1.475 
75th percentile 2.83 1.86 
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Time before Refiling: Later Bankruptcy 
(B) 
	
33 of 34 

















Note: If required and for graphical purpose only, outliers were presented as assuming the either the 95th 
or the 99th percentile. 












 Healthy Insolvent PER 
Observations 382 315 278 
Mean 0.205 -0.154 -0.112 
25th percentile 0.01 -0.39 -0.31 
Median 0.22 -0.06 -0.035 
75th percentile 0.48 0.27 0.26 
St. Dev. 0.406 0.680 0.618 
 Healthy Insolvent PER 
Observations 382 315 278 
Mean 0.006 -0.314 -0.291 
25th percentile -0.12 -0.46 -0.32 
Median 0.02 -0.1 -0.08 
75th percentile 0.14 0.03 0.01 
St. Dev. 0.341 0.674 0.655 
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Note: If required and for graphical purpose only, outliers were presented as assuming the either the 95th 
or the 99th percentile. 
Normal distribution curve for graphical purposes only. 
 
 Healthy Insolvent PER 
Observations 382 315 278 
Mean 1.66 0.079 0.087 
25th percentile 0.09 -0.28 -0.13 
Median 0.37 -0.04 0.07 
75th percentile 0.93 0.19 0.29 
St. Dev. 7.210 1.208 0.3747 
 Healthy Insolvent PER 
Observations 382 315 278 
Mean -0.001 -0.279 -0.119 
25th percentile -0.02 -0.35 -0.14 
Median 0.02 -0.12 -0.04 
75th percentile 0.05 0 0 
St. Dev. 0.151 0.551 0.365 
